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1. Introduction 
During the last 30 years there has been a distinct growth of labour 
market policies professedly aimed at promoting the creation of 
employment1 through the use of non-standard work contracts2, such as 
fixed-term and/or part-time employment or temporary agency work 
(TAW). 
In most of the cases, these reforms neither significantly affect the 
standard, open-ended, full-time contract of employment nor the relevant 
dismissal regulations.  
This “flexibility at the margin” approach has now been called into 
question even by those institutions that had previously advocated 
deregulation of non-standard and “flexible” forms of employment:3 the 
risk, it is now argued, is that workers, particularly young workers, women 
or workers belonging to disadvantaged groups, are “trapped” in an 
endless series of precarious, instable working contracts for a considerable 
amount of their working lives. 
It is suggested, in particular, that facilitating the use of temporary 
work contracts, without reforming the open-ended employment 
relationship by loosening protection against dismissal, has been the cause 
of a negative segmentation of the labour market.  
Additionally, strong dismissal protection is argued to incentivize 
employers to look for contractual arrangements granting the elimination 
or reduction of termination costs. 
These costs would generate “dualism” of labour markets, namely a 
sharp division between the labour market of insiders, the "guaranteed" 
with permanent contracts and high protection from employers’ 
                                                          
1  There is no consensus on the potentialities of using temporary work contracts as a 
«stepping stone» towards stable jobs. See F. Berton, F. Deficienti, L. Pacelli, Are temporary 
jobs a port of entry into permanent employment? Evidence from matched employer-
employee data, in Department of Economics and Public Finance “G.Prato” Working Paper 
Series, No.6 – June 2009; G. Barbieri, P. Sestito, Temporary workers in Italy: Who Are They 
and Where They End Up, in Labour, 22, 2008, 1, pages 127-166; A.L. Booth, M. 
Francesconi, J. Frank, Temporary jobs: stepping stones or dead ends?, in The economic 
Journal, 112(480), 2002, pages. 189-213. 
2 For a comparative overview of fixed-term work regulation in France, Germany, Italy. Spain 
and the UK, see B. Caruso, S. Sciarra, Flexibility and Security in Temporary Work: A 
Comparative and European Debate, in 
WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona” .INT – 56/2007. 
3  For instance, Directive 2008/104/EC and Directive 1999/70/EC indicate non-standard 
forms of employment as an effective way to, respectively “contribute to job creation” and to 
“respond, in certain circumstances, to the needs of both employers and workers”. See also, 
The OECD Jobs study. Facts, Analysis, Strategies, 1994. 
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termination, and the market of the outsiders, the “not-guaranteed” 
forced into a prolonged and indefinite series of non-standard contracts 
characterized by high instability4.  
Segmentation of the labour market, as a direct result of the 
regulations governing dismissal, is an issue currently under discussion at 
the economic, legal and political institutions in different European 
countries. According to the EU Commission, for instance, in order to 
tackle the issue of segmentation, “employment protection legislation 
should be reformed to reduce over-protection of workers with permanent 
contracts, and provide protection to those left outside or at the margins 
of the job market”5. Accordingly, several reforms have been proposed or 
enacted across EU Member States in recent years to address these 
issues. 
In a recent paper, Simon Deakin provided an extensive overview of 
the economic and legal theories of labour market segmentation 6 . 
Subsequently, he also identified three types of institutional responses to 
segmentation, followed by several European countries in recent years: (i) 
a first technique implies changes in the scope of labour law protections, 
including “legal measures that widen the definition of wage-dependent 
labour and minimize or remove qualifying thresholds” in order to have 
“fewer workers […] excluded from the ‘core’ protected category”; (ii) the 
second type of responses concerns “the content of labour law 
protections”, for instance, by “mandating equal (or pro rata) protections 
for workers in atypical work relationships to those in the ‘core’ (‘levelling 
up’)” and/or “reducing the protections which apply to the workers in the 
core, so as to bring them closer into line with those in the atypical 
                                                          
4 See. Bouis R., Causa O., Demmou L., Duval R., Zdzienicka A., The Short-Term Effects of 
Structural Reforms: An Empirical Analysis, in OECD Economic Department Working Papers, 
No. 949, 2012, OECD Publishing; O. van Vliet, H. Nijebor, Flexicurity in the European Union: 
Flexibility for Outsiders, Security for Insiders, Leiden Law School, Department of Economics 
Research Memorandum 2012.2; S. Bentolila, J. F., Jimeno, J. J. Dolado, Reforming an 
Insider-Outsider Labor Market: The Spanish Experience," in Working Papers, 2012-01, 
FEDEAT. Boeri, P. Garibaldi, Two Tier Reforms of Employment Protection: a Honeymoon 
Effect?, in Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, 117(521), 2007, pages 357-385; O. 
Blanchard, A. Landier, The Perverse Effects of Partial Labor Market Reform: Fixed Duration 
Contracts in France, in Economic Journal 112, 2002, pages 214-244. 
5 EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European economic and social committee and the Committee of Regions, Annual Growth 
Survey: advancing the EU's comprehensive response to the crisis, Annual Growth Survey: 
advancing the EU's comprehensive response to the crisis, COM(2011) 11 final. A similar 
approach is followed by OECD, Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth 2012. 
6 S. Deakin, Addressing labour market segmentation: The role of labour law, Working Paper 
no. 52, Governance and Tripartism Department, International Labour Office, Geneva, 
October 2013. 
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categories (‘levelling down’)”; (iii) techniques within the latter category 
make use of the law “to stimulate alternative mechanisms of labour 
market regulation” such as “collective bargaining, training policy, and 
fiscal incentives”. 
Grouping legal responses into these three categories is helpful in 
assessing the scope of recent labour market regulation reforms across 
Europe. These categories, however, do not necessarily have rigid 
confines: it will be argued below that they may have rather “fluid” or 
“flexible” borders, with some legal responses falling simultaneously 
within, or sometimes at the border between, two categories. 
Additionally, in the last decade the EU Commission constantly called 
for “addressing segmented labour markets, through reforms in line with 
the “flexicurity” approach that shift the focus from protection on the job 
to employment security in the market”7.  
This papers deals with the mainstream approach to addressing 
segmentation of the labour market and with the reforms adopted or 
proposed in different countries, supposedly aimed at boosting 
employment rates cut down by the current economic crisis 8  that are 
purportedly consistent with this approach. 
It will be argued that the mainstream narrative of segmentation 
presenting this issue as a matter of two-tier labour markets divided on 
the basis of the regulation of standard employment relationship and of its 
termination draws on a very limited set of theories concerning 
segmentation, namely “insiders-outsiders” theories, somehow merged 
with some legal theories about segmentation. Significant findings of 
alternative or successive economic and legal theories on this issue are 
disregarded by the mainstream approach: this results in an 
oversimplification, which hardly corresponds to the reality of the 
                                                          
7 EU Commission, Commission Working Document, European Commission Background Paper 
to the EPSCO Council, The Employment crisis. Trends, policy responses and key actions, 
2009. See also, EU Commission, Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st 
century, 22.11.2006 COM(2006) 708 final GREEN PAPER. 
8  A vast literature already exists on the ideas underpinning labour market policies 
undertaken by European countries and/or supported by European and international 
institutions: see N. Countouris, M. Freedland, Labour regulation and the economic crisis in 
Europe: challenges, responses and prospects, in  J. Hayes, L. Rychly (eds.), Labour 
administration in uncertain times. Policies, Practices and Institutions, Cheltenham, 2013, 
pages 66-94; S. Deakin, A. Koukiadaki, The sovereign debt crisis and the evolution of 
labour law in Europe, in N. Countouris, M. Freedland (eds.), Resocialising Europe in a time 
of crisis, Cambridge, 2013, pages 163-188. S. Sciarra, Common places, new places. The 
labour law rhetoric of the crisis, in WP CSDLE “Massimo D’Antona” .INT 92/2012; C. 
Barnard, The Financial Crisis and the Europlus Pact: a Labour Lawyer’s Perspective, in 
Industrial Law Journal, 41, 2012, pages 98-114.   
6 VALERIO DE STEFANO 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 102/2013 
European labour markets.   
As to the “flexicurity” approach, it has first of all been argued that, if 
one looks at the convergence in labour policies across Europe, “there has 
not been a general tendency towards the adoption of labour market 
policies designed to deliver ‘flexicurity’: the dominant trend has instead 
been towards less security”9. Beside the fact that EU Member States may 
have not satisfactorily re-joined the call for flexicurity, this paper will 
argue that urging a shift from job protection to “employment security in 
the market” may lead to the neglect of some important features of the 
employment relationship, the role of job protection and, in general, of 
employment regulation. 
Section 2 will deal with the main ideas underpinning the mainstream 
approach to segmentation of the labour market and refers to an 
alternative theoretical explanation of this phenomenon. Section 3 outlines 
the reforms recently passed in Italy, Spain and Portugal to loosen the 
protection against unfair dismissal in these countries. Section 4 shows 
how, despite these reforms purportedly aiming at reducing the gap 
between the protection of standard and non-standard workers, no 
significant increase in the protection of the latter occurred: in some of 
these jurisdictions it was instead weakened. Section 5 questions the very 
idea of “dual” labour markets, pointing out that working conditions may 
vary heavily among supposed “insiders” on the basis of various elements 
unrelated to the scope of unfair dismissal regulations or other legal 
features. Section 6 outlines some findings of the “insiders-outsiders” 
economic theories, showing that they do not significantly deal with the 
legal regulation of unfair dismissal but chiefly focus instead on traditional 
aspects of the U.S. industrial relations system, one that can hardy be 
compared with continental European systems where general unionism is 
largely present. Section 7, however, argues that recent reforms endorsed 
by the EU Commission, and aimed at the decentralisation of collective 
bargaining systems in different, countries may weaken the “inclusive” 
nature of industrial relations systems of continental Europe, potentially 
leading to the marginalisation of non-standard workers. Section 8 
                                                          
9 J. Heyes, Flexicurity, employment protection and the jobs crisis, in Work Employment 
Society 25, 2011, pages 642-657. See also S. Deakin, supra, note 6; L. Zappalà, Flexicurity 
e valorizzazione delle capability: l'impulso alla ri-regolamentazione del lavoro a termine, in 
WP CSDLE “Massimo D’Antona” .INT – 97/2012; M. Del Conte, L'influenza del diritto 
comunitario sul diritto del lavoro italiano fra tutele e flessibilità, in Mario Napoli, Mariella 
Magnani (eds.), Studi Treu, Lavoro, Istituzioni, cambiamento sociale, Neaples, 2011, pages 
1435-1449; S. Sciarra, Is Flexicurity a European Policy?, URGE Working Paper 4/2008. 
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underlines that segmentation of the labour market is not a novel 
phenomenon originating in recent “flexibility-at-the-margin” reforms, but 
has been a permanent feature of capitalist labour market since the dawn 
of industrialization and might have been sharpened as a result of 
entrepreneurial trends towards business de-concentration in the last 40 
years, augmenting the divide between core and marginal workforces. 
Section 9 then argues that proposed reforms aimed at introducing the 
“single permanent contract” and, in general, policies aimed at reducing 
dualism between standard and non-standard workers by flattening the 
relevant legal protection may prove unsatisfactory as they neglect the 
differences between marginal and core business activities and 
workforces. Section 10 concludes, remarking the role of job protection 
and dismissal regulation not only in preserving the employee’s income 
but also in supporting the effectiveness of fundamental and constitutional 
rights during the course of the employment: a complete shift from job 
protection to “employment security in the market” is then called into 
question.   
2. The mainstream approach to segmentation: a tale of 
oversimplification. 
As already mentioned, European institutions tend to follow implicitly or 
explicitly a particular explanation for segmentation of labour markets: 
segmentation is more often than not referred to as a matter of “dualism” 
concerning an allegedly “two-tier” labour market where “insiders” benefit 
“from high levels of employment protection” while “outsiders” are 
“recruited under alternative forms of contracts with lower protections” 10. 
In this respect, the Kok Report also argued that “overly protective 
terms and conditions can deter employers from hiring in economic 
upturns or encourage them to resort to other forms of contract, which 
can have a negative impact on the ability of less advantaged workers – 
notably young people, women and the long-term unemployed – to access 
jobs”.  
In order to address these issues, the report particularly advocated 
“where necessary”, altering “the level of flexibility provided in standard 
contracts in areas such as periods of notice, costs and procedures for 
individual and collective dismissal, or the definition of unfair dismissal” 
and “in parallel” reviewing “the role of other forms of contract […] with a 
view to providing more options for employers and employees depending 
                                                          
10  Jobs, Jobs, Jobs. Creating more Employment in Europe, Report of the Employment 
Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok, November 2003. 
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on their needs and adequate security for workers”. 
At the time the report was drafted, then, it had not yet been argued 
that making available non-standard contracts could foster segmentation 
of the labour market: on the contrary the report encouraged Member 
States to “provide more options” in this regard; on the other hand, 
employers’ recourse to these working arrangements was already ascribed 
to excessive protection of standard employees, particularly protection 
against dismissal. 
Notoriously, the EU Commission’s 2006 Green Paper endorsed the 
findings of the Kok Report, thereby validating the idea of segmentation as 
a result of overly protective regulation of the standard employment 
relationship and of its termination11; the Commission in the present days 
still supports the view that segmentation is a “typical outcome of strict 
EPL for open-ended contracts”, although less emphasis is now put on 
making “more options” available to employers, with regard to non-
standard work12.  
The issue of segmentation was thus mainly reduced to a risk of “two-
tier” labour markets predominantly imputed to the scope and strictness 
of dismissal laws: this approach, however, seems to oversimplify the 
several origins and aspects of segmentation. 
In the abovementioned overview, for instance, Deakin shows how 
labour market segmentation has been explained through, or related to, 
different causes, among which policies implemented by employers such 
as those establishing internal labour markets, often enhanced by the 
existence of “asset-specific” capabilities 13 , or the practices of those 
employers who set wages above the market-clearing point or offer job 
security in order to incentivise their workers, particularly when 
monitoring the workforce is too expensive or inaccurate (efficiency wage 
theory)14. In these cases, it has indeed been argued that it is possible for 
                                                          
11  EU Commission, Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century, 
supra, note 7. See S. Sciarra, EU Commission Green Paper ‘Modernising labour law to meet 
the challenges of the 21st century’, in Industrial Law Journal, 36, 2007, pages 375-382. 
12 EU Commission, Labour Market Developments in Europe 2012, in European Economy, 
5|2012. 
13  P. Doeringer, M. Piore, Internal labor markets and manpower analysis, Manpower 
Administration (DOL) Office of Manpower Research, Washington D.C., 1970; O. Williamson, 
O., M. Wachter, J. Harris, Understanding the employment relation: The economics of 
idiosyncratic exchange, in Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 6, 1975, 
pages 250-278. 
14 See C. Shapiro, J. Stiglitz, Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device, in 
The American Economic Review, 74, 1984, pages. 433-444; J. Yellen, Efficiency wage 
models of unemployment, in American Economic Review, 74, 1984 200-205.; S. Bowles, 
Competitive wage determination and involuntary unemployment: a conflict model, 
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“laws that require just cause to increase efficiency” and reduce 
segmentation rather than foster it15. 
The European Commission and several other institutions and 
commentators disregarded most of the findings of these theories and 
focus instead on a particular explanation of segmentation, based on the 
so-called “insider-outsider” theory, namely a partial elaboration of 
efficiency-wage theory that – it will be explored further below – stresses 
the role of trade unions in causing segmentation16; in addition, particular 
concern is devoted to the role of the full-time, open-ended, standard 
employment relation (SER) as a cause of segmentation: this was also a 
main concern of legal theories regarding segmentation17. 
The European Commission and several other institutions and 
commentators disregarded most of the findings of these theories and 
focus instead on a particular explanation of segmentation, based on the 
so-called “insider-outsider” theory, namely a partial elaboration of 
efficiency-wage theory that – it will be explored further below – stresses 
the role of trade unions in causing segmentation.   
3. Individual dismissal regulation after the recent 
reforms in Italy, Spain and Portugal: a tale of 
deregulation 
In Italy, since the mid-90s, the issue of segmentation is more often 
than not referred as a matter of “dualism” between the labour market(s) 
of “guaranteed” and “not-guaranteed” workers depending on the scope of 
the so-called "tutela reale" against unfair dismissal, provided by Article 
18 of Law n. 300/1970 (Statuto dei Lavoratori): insiders are deemed 
those who are protected by Art. 18, any other worker being an outsider, 
regardless of the nature of their working relationship (self-employed, 
temporary or permanent employment) 18. 
                                                                                                                                                      
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics, 1981; G. Calvo, Quasi-Walrasian 
Theories of Unemployment, in The American Economic Review, Vol. 69, 1979, pages 102-
107;  
15 D. Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection, 
in Journal of Labor Economics, 9, 1991, pages 294-305. 
16  A. Lindbeck, D. Snower, Insiders versus Outsiders, in The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15, 2001, pages. 165-188; A. Lindbeck, D. Snower, Cooperation, harassment 
and involuntary unemployment: An insider-outsider approach, in American Economic 
Review, 78, 1988, pages 167-88. 
17 See references in S. Deakin, supra, note 6. 
18 See P. Ichino Il lavoro e il mercato. Per un diritto del lavoro maggiorenne, Milano, 1996; 
Id., Inchiesta sul lavoro. Perché non dobbiamo avere paura di una grande riforma, Milano, 
2011. For a critical review of this approach see F. Carinci, “Provaci ancora, Sam”: ripartendo 
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Protection against unfair dismissal vary significantly in Italy, depending 
on the size of the workforce employed within a single work unit or by the 
same employer. 
In Italy, if an employer has 60 or fewer employees, or 15 or fewer 
employees in a single work unit, in case of unfair dismissal the employer 
can be ordered to either re-engage the employee under a new contract or 
pay an indemnity varying in general between two-and-a-half and six 
months’ salary, the choice is the employer’s.  
This protection regime is usually referred as “tutela obbligatoria”, 
implying that remedies under this protection only entail monetary 
sanctions while more effective sanctions, such as reinstatement, are not 
generally provided (unless the dismissal is deemed discriminatory or 
retaliatory).  
Above these thresholds, before the 2012 labour market reform, in case 
of unfair dismissal, the employer could be ordered to both reinstate the 
employee under the original contract19 and to pay uncapped damages 
amounting to the employee’s salary between the date of dismissal and 
the date of actual reinstatement (but with a minimum of five months’ 
salary). This regime was provided by Article 18 of the Statuto dei 
Lavoratori and was normally referred as “tutela reale”, where “reale” 
stood for both “effective” and “real”, since reinstatement was seen as a 
much stronger protection relative to monetary sanctions, almost giving 
rise – in theory – to something alike “property rights” concerning one’s 
job. 
Since the 2012 labour market reform, this latter regime has been 
diluted. Article 18 of the Statuto dei Lavoratori now provides for 
reinstatement on top of uncapped damages only in case of discriminatory 
or retaliatory dismissal20. 
  Within the scope of the “tutela reale”, these remedies were 
previously provided in case of unfair dismissal for either disciplinary 
matters or economic/redundancy reasons; the same would also apply to 
dismissals not meeting the statutory formal or procedural requirements. 
                                                                                                                                                      
dall’art. 18., in W.P.C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.IT, n. 138/2012; M.T. Carinci, Il 
rapporto di lavoro al tempo della crisi: modelli europei e flexicurity "all’italiana" a confronto, 
in Giornale di Diritto del Lavoro e di Relazioni Industriali, 136, 2012, pages 527-572; V. 
Speziale, La riforma del licenziamento individuale tra diritto ed economia, in Rivista italiana 
di Diritto del lavoro, 2012, pages 521-566. 
19  However, the employee could elect instead to receive an indemnity in lieu of 
reinstatement, equal to 15 months’ salary. 
20 See M. Biasi, The Effect of the World Crisis on Employment Law and Industrial Relations: 
report on Italy, forthcoming in Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal. 
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Without going too deep into the analysis of the current legislation, it is 
worth noting that remedies are now different for disciplinary and 
economic dismissals. In both of these cases, however, the role of 
reinstatement and the amount of damages are significantly limited 
compared with the pre-2012 regime. 
By way of example, reinstatement and damages of up to 12 months’ 
salary only apply if the dismissal was for disciplinary reasons based on 
events that did not occur. They also apply if the collective bargaining 
agreement provides for a sanction for misconduct that is less severe than 
dismissal.  
In any other case of unfair disciplinary dismissal, the employer has to 
pay an indemnity of 12 to 24 months’ salary, but not reinstate the 
employee. 
As to economic dismissal, since the 2012 reform, the court may only 
insist upon reinstatement when the dismissal is for an economic or 
redundancy reason that is visibly non-existent.  
Even in this case, reinstatement is only an option for the court if it 
could alternatively award an indemnity of 12 to 24 months’ salary. The 
same will also be recognised to an employee in any other cases of unfair 
economic dismissal. 
Courts have not yet developed a coherent set of criteria for 
reinstatement under the new law: some judgements have been keen to 
follow an approach of granting reinstatement according to principles 
similar to those governing the application of the pre-reform regime, 
whereas many other judgments have started to shape new sets of 
criteria, whereby reinstatement is significantly restricted. 
Even in the absence of a coherent set of case law principles concerning 
reinstatement, it can be said that dismissal regulations in Italy were 
materially relaxed by the 2012 reform: damages in case of unfair 
dismissal are now strictly capped, let alone the possibility of 
reinstatement: nowadays, it is even debatable whether it still makes 
sense to label the protection under Article 18 as “tutela reale”: if reale 
were to be deemed to imply something more than “effective”, hinting at 
something like “real”, one could argue that making reference to “tutela 
reale” is now somehow outmoded. 
Dismissal regulation has also been significantly loosened in Spain and 
Portugal over the last years. 
In Spain21, economic losses, whether current or merely expected, or 
                                                          
21 See M.E. Casas Baamonde, M. Rodriguez-Piñero y Bravo-Ferrer, F. Valdés Dal Re, La 
nueva reforma laboral, Relaciones Laborales, 2012, pages 1-39; J. Cruz Villalón, Los 
cambios en materia de extinciones individuales en la reforma laboral de 2012, in Relaciones 
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declining revenues now amount to sufficient cause for fair dismissal for 
economic reasons. Other economic or objective reasons have been more 
clearly defined and notice of dismissal was reduced from 30 to 15 days. 
 Severance pay for standard employment contracts was cut to 33 
days’ wages per year of service (it was 45 days before the reform) with a 
24-month cap – this removes the distinction between a standard 
employment contract and the employment-promotion permanent 
contract, introduced in 1997)22.  
Employers with less than 50 employees can now hire workers under a 
permanent employment contract (Contrato de Apoyo a Emprendedores) 
subject to a one-year probation period during which the contract can be 
terminated without severance pay23.  
After the probationary period, severance pay would apply which would 
be equal to 33 or 20 days’ wages per year of service respectively if the 
dismissal is fair or unfair. 
Remarkably, public bodies’ authorization is no longer a requirement for 
collective dismissal. 
In Portugal24, the definition of fair individual dismissal was relaxed: 
senior employees or employees performing complex tasks may now be 
dismissed for unsuitability (inadaptação) without their being a need for 
the introduction of new technology to which the employee is unable to 
adapt – this was a requirement before the reform. Other employees may 
be dismissed for unsuitability if they fail to achieve previously agreed 
work objectives. The last-in-first-out tenure rule, in case of economic 
dismissal, was also abolished. 
Severance payment for employees hired after 1 November 2011 was 
reduced from 30 to 20 days’ wages per year of service25, with a cap of 12 
months – the minimum amount of 3 months no longer applies – and the 
employer only pays 10 days’ wages, the remaining 10 days being paid by 
                                                                                                                                                      
laborales: Revista crítica de teoría y práctica, 2012, pages 121-147; J. Gorelli Hernández, 
La reforma laboral de 2012 y su impacto en los despidos individuales, in Temas Laborales, 
115, 2012, pages 275-314; S. Bentolila, J. F., Jimeno, J. J. Dolado, supra, note 4. 
22 Workers hired before February 2012 and unfairly dismissed will be entitled to a weighted 
average of the former 45-day and the new 33-day regimes, with a 720-day cap. 
23  Employers using these contracts will enjoy substantial fiscal subsidies insofar as the 
workers remain employed for at least 3 years 
24 A. Pestana Nascimento, A reforma laboral em Portugal, in Actualidad Juridica, Especial 
reformas estructurales / Extraordinario-2012, pages 47-61; A Turrini, EPL reforms in 
Europe: A Portuguese way to single contract outcomes?, 2011 at 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/labour-market-reforms-lessons-portugal.  
25 An interim regime was provided for workers hired before 1 November 2011severance 
payments will be calculated taking into account tenures under the previous regime (until 31 
October 2012) and the new one.   
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a new employment fund, financed by employers. 
Lawmakers in Italy, Spain and Portugal have therefore followed the 
European institution’s call for reducing protection for standard 
employees; the next section shows, however, that the same cannot be 
said for the appeal to better protect non-standard work. 
4. Reforms of non-standard contracts in Italy, Spain 
and Portugal: Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing. 
As already mentioned, recent reforms of the Italian, Spanish and 
Portuguese labour regulations did not only concern protection against 
dismissal26.  
In Italy, the purported goal of lawmakers was a general reshaping of 
labour protection in order to address the issue of dualism in the labour 
market. This was also meant to be done by reviewing the existing 
regulation of non-standard forms of employment. 
 According to the very first article of the relevant act, the reform was 
aimed at “redistributing workers’ protection more equitably, on the one 
hand by countering the misuse of the legal schemes already introduced in 
order to provide flexibility [in the labour market], on the other hand by 
adapting dismissal regulations to the changed [business] environment”. 
It is noticeable the alleged attempt to even – or, at least, to reduce – 
the inequality between the situation of those who have relative job 
stability because they are granted effective protection against unfair 
dismissal, and workers who do not enjoy such stability. The reform is 
then professedly in line with the EU Commission’s appeal to reduce the 
protection against unfair dismissal of standard employees whilst providing 
“protection to those left outside or at the margins of the job market”.   
Article 1 of the reform act27, then, seems to sanction an “exchange” 
between greater flexibility in the standard employment relationship of 
insiders, gained by loosening protections against dismissal, and less 
flexibility at the margin, to better protect the outsiders, with the purpose 
of reducing the dualism of the labour market. 
Similarly the Spanish reform’s preamble declared that its provisions 
aim to “enhance the efficiency of the labour market as it is linked to the 
reduction of labour dualism, with measures affecting chiefly the 
termination of employment contracts”28.  
                                                          
26 See references, supra, notes 20, 21, 24. 
27 Article 1, l. 28 Giugno 2012, n. 92 
28  Article II, Real Decreto-ley 3/2012, de 10 de febrero, de medidas urgentes para la 
reforma del mercado laboral 
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The legal measures put in place to counter dualism in the labour 
market can nonetheless be called into question.  
The recent Italian reforms loosened unfair dismissal regulations but 
did not appreciably increase protections for non-standard employees. 
The law, indeed, restricted the regulation of parasubordinate “project 
work”: for instance, project workers’ compensation must now comply 
with minimum compensation levels set our by national collective 
bargaining agreements for parasubordinate workers or aligned with 
minimum salaries provided by those agreements. Moreover, the law 
clarified that “project work” cannot be entered for the performance of 
very simple and repetitive tasks. The reform also clarified that, when a 
proper “project” is not provided, parasubordinate contracts are to be 
deemed subordinate under a non-rebuttable presumption. 
A rebuttable presumption of parasubordination was instead introduced 
for non-parasubordinate self-employment when some conditions apply29. 
This presumption would operate in combination with the abovementioned 
non-rebuttable presumption if a proper project were not provided, 
possibly leading to reclassification under a subordinate contract. 
According to the abovementioned categorization of legal techniques30 
aimed at addressing segmentation, these measures may be classified 
under the first category, as they widen the scope of protective regulation 
and combat the use of bogus self-employment (including 
parasubordination), attempting to bring some “grey-area” cases within 
the scope of employment. 
However, these protective elements should not be overestimated. On 
the one hand, the law merely restates some principles already applied by 
the majority of case law, for example, most courts were already 
considering the presumption of subordination in cases where a proper 
“project” did not exist as a non- rebuttable one. On the other hand, the 
really new protections, such as the minimum compensation provisions or 
the rebuttable presumption of para-subordination, could easily drive 
employers to resort to other non-standard contracts that were further 
liberalized. 
In particular, the law abolished the need to link fixed-term contracts 
and temporary agency work to an objective reason for the first contract 
                                                          
29 The rebuttable presumption will operate if two of the following requirements are met: (i) 
the activity exceeds eight months a year for two consecutive years; (ii) the income from 
such activity is below c. 19,000 Euro and it is equal to the 80 per cent of the overall 
revenues earned by the self-employed worker during the past two years; (iii) the self-
employed worker has a workstation at the principal’s premises. 
30 See S. Deakin, supra, note 6. 
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up to 12 months – according to the majority of case law, objective 
reasons were also to be “temporary” in nature for fixed-term 
employment. This is a material liberalization because most of these 
contracts are entered into for very short periods.  
The 2012 reform tried to balance this deregulation by establishing that 
no extensions of contracts stipulated without specifying the relevant 
objective reasons could be provided and by increasing the minimum 
interruption periods between the previous fixed-term employment 
contract expiring and a new one beginning with the same employee. 
Before the 2012 reform, these periods were 10 days and 20 days, 
respectively, for contracts under and over 6 months; they were increased 
to 60 and to 90 days respectively. In 2013, however, lawmakers made 
extensions of fixed-term contracts legitimate up to 12 months in total 
and decreased the mandatory interruption periods to their original 
duration. 
As a consequence, the use of fixed-term and temporary agency work 
contracts has now been significantly liberalised in comparison with the 
pre-2012 regime: this is plainly inconsistent with the purported aim of 
the 2012 reform. 
If one adds this liberalisation to the loosening of unfair dismissal 
regulations the result is a clear levelling down of employment protection 
that in no way can be deemed balanced by the renewed regulation of 
parasubordination. 
If we come back to Deakin’s categorization, it could then be said that 
the recent reforms of the Italian labour market lie somehow both under 
the first category (with more defined classifications of parasubordination 
and self-employment) and under the second category (with a reduction of 
protections for both standard employment and some crucial non-standard 
contracts). 
Inconsistency between the alleged purpose of the reforms and their 
actual scope, however, is not limited to Italy. In Portugal, severance 
payments for fixed-term employees were reduced from 36 or 24 days’ 
wages per year of service (respectively for contracts shorter or longer 
than 6 months) to 20 days: the reform therefore significantly affects 
workers with shorter contracts, with their severance cut by more than 
1/3. In Spain, severance pay will be slightly increased from 8 to 12 days’ 
wages per year of service for fixed-term employees. 
It can, therefore, be said that the part of the reforms concerning non-
standard workers was either contradictory with the alleged purpose of 
bettering their conditions (Italy and Portugal) or still feeble (Spain).  
In Spain, however, an important reform had been passed in 2007 
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introducing significant protections for economically dependant self-
employed workers31 . This may also bring the set of Spanish reforms 
adopted in the last decade within both the first and the second of the 
above-mentioned categories, with legal techniques aimed at widening the 
scope of protective legislation coupled with a significant levelling-down of 
the protection for open-ended employment and a weak levelling-up 
concerning non-standard workers32. 
It may however be incorrect to lump the 2007 and the 2010-2011 
reforms together, as they were adopted in a very different economic and 
institutional situation; anyhow, the recent weakening of the regulation 
governing dismissal of standard employees seems to outweigh the 
benefits introduced by the Spanish lawmakers with regard to atypical 
contracts33.  
One can then argue that the alleged reduction of dualism in the 
Spanish labour market was mainly carried out at the expense of open-
ended employment was not balanced by a corresponding levelling-up of 
the protection for the remaining workforce. The same can be said about 
the latest reforms in Italy and Portugal34. 
5. Can legal regulation actually generate “dualism” of 
labour markets? 
After this brief overview of the legal measures adopted in different EU 
Member States currently facing serious economic downturn in order to 
combat dualism in the labour market, it is now time to discuss more 
deeply the very ideas looking at “dualism” chiefly as a direct result of the 
scope of the legal rules governing standard employment relationships 
and, in particular, the regulation of dismissal. 
It has been argued above that the mainstream approach to 
segmentation – endorsed by the EU Commission – couples elements of 
“insiders-outsiders” economic theories with the findings of some legal 
theories that focus on the relevant role of the standard employment 
relationship; under this approach, workers employed under a standard 
employment relationship are often referred as “insiders”. 
                                                          
31 Ley 20/2007, de 11 de julio, del Estatuto del trabajo autónomo (LETA). 
32 The last reforms in Italy, Spain and Portugal also affected the system of unemployment 
benefits and, in some cases, also involved monetary incentives /subsides aimed at the 
“stabilization” of workers: it could thus be said that they also partially fit in the third set of 
legal techniques categorized by Simon Deakin. 
33 M. Rodriguez-Piñero Royo, La forza del mercato: le riforme del diritto del lavoro spagnolo 
durante la crisi finanziaria  mondiale, in Giornale di Diritto del Lavoro e di Relazioni 
Industriali, 137, 2013, pages 91-106. 
34 See also S. Deakin, A. Koukiadaki, supra, note 8. 
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As argued at Section 2, this approach tends to ignore the results of 
both other economic theories concerning segmentation of the labour 
market and of legal theories that warn against over-estimating the role of 
law in influencing other social systems such as the economic one35: legal 
rules and their revisions do not mechanistically influence the economic 
system or drive changes into it. 
In light of this, considering the regulation of standard employment 
contracts and particularly the relevant regulation of dismissal as the main 
cause of segmentation in the labour market is unconvincing. One might 
indeed argue that the very idea of a clear-cut and simple “dualism” in the 
labour market of modern advanced economies is an over-simplification: 
deeming “insiders” all workers hired under a standard employment 
contract and subject to dismissal regulation, for instance, on the one 
hand overlooks substantial differences in working conditions among these 
workers, and, on the other, it disregards many extra-legal factors 
affecting these conditions. 
By way of example, working conditions vary widely according to the 
geographical location of the firm (for example, urban or rural region, 
developed or depressed area within a country) or to its size (one can 
hardly compare, in this respect, a company with a workforce of 100 
people and one with a workforce of 1,000, although they would be 
subject to the same dismissal regulations in most of the jurisdictions 
differentiating dismissal regimes on the basis of the workforce’s size, 
such as Italy, Spain and Germany).  
In addition, working conditions often differ depending on the 
ownership and corporate structure of the employer and – to some extent 
– also according to its nationality: work organizations and human 
resources cultures can vary significantly between a family-run enterprise 
and companies belonging to a multinational group.  
Assuming the labour market to be dual also seems to underestimate 
differences depending upon levels of professionalism, the nature of the 
tasks carried out and the relevant classification or job role within a 
company or, to stay with the personal characteristics of employees, their 
skills and their "employability" within the labour market, or their level of 
education. 
 Working conditions may significantly be affected by the degree of 
                                                          
35 See S. Deakin, supra, note 6; R. Rogowski, Reflexive labour law in the world society, 
2013, Cheltenham; S. Deakin, R. Rogowski, Reflexive labour law, capabilities, and the 
future of social Europe, in R. Rogowski, R. Salais and N. Whiteside (eds.): Transforming 
European employment policy: Labour market transitions and the promotion of capability, 
Cheltenham, 2011. 
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unionization within a company, the presence of trade unions and 
employees’ representative bodies at the workplace, the existence and 
quality of labour relations at the shop or enterprise level. Even more, it is 
impossible to overlook the application of sector- and/or enterprise- or 
shop-based collective agreements and – ceteris paribus – the economic 
sector or industry: we could hardly explain, otherwise, outsourcing 
practices motivated by the desire to change the applicable collective 
bargaining agreements. 
For all these reasons, it is simplistic to represent advanced economies’ 
labour markets as dual as a function of the discipline of dismissal.  
If one considers the Italian labour market, for instance, it is 
unsatisfactory to assume Article 18 of Statuto dei Lavoratori as a 
watershed between insiders and outsiders. There are, for example, some 
insiders who are outside the scope of Article 18 in Italy, such as 
executives (dirigenti) 36 : in the vast majority of cases, they enjoy 
contractual protection against unfair dismissal, either set out by collective 
agreements or by individual terms of employment. This protection is 
more often than not much higher than that afforded to comparable 
managers in other advanced countries37.  
On the other hand, it is unrealistic to define as “insiders” those 
workers who, albeit falling within the scope of tutela reale, carry out an 
unskilled repetitive and/or manual job, possibly employed by firms with 
little or no unionization or those workers to whom no collective 
agreements or “minor” collective agreements apply. 
In light of the above, it is not convincing to see legal protection 
against dismissal as a breakpoint for working conditions in labour 
markets, regardless of the type of remedy that may be awarded under 
the relevant legal system: working conditions vary widely irrespective of 
the scope of legal protections on the basis of circumstances that do not 
regard legal regulation and the extent to which the legal reforms 
currently addressed to segmentation may alter those conditions seems 
very limited in scope. 
                                                          
36  Under Italian law this is the highest category of employees. Dirigenti may also be 
appointed by shareholders as members of the company’s board of directors of a company 
(amministratori) but this is not always the case in Italy.  
37  Collective bargaining agreements for executives often provide for a supplementary 
indemnity in case of unfair dismissal that may amount up to 20 months’ salaries of total 
compensation (including averages of bonus and benefits in kind paid in the last 36 months 
of employment) and may increase if executives meet certain age requirements (usually 
when they are between their mid-fifties and mid-sixties). Supplementary indemnities are 
due on top of notice periods or payment-in-lieu. 
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6. “Insiders-outsiders” models and continental 
European unionism: please handle with care! 
Segmentation, furthermore, undoubtedly also affects labour markets 
of countries where no strong or general rules restricting dismissals exist, 
such as the United States38. 
It is noteworthy that the scientific debate around the conflicts of 
interest between outsiders and insiders and its effects originally 
developed in the United States and that the relevant literature does not 
focus on the scope of dismissal regulation; it traditionally emphasised the 
role of unions and now also stresses, more generally, the replacement 
costs that companies incur in replacing insiders with outsiders.  
Replacement costs include “the costs of hiring, firing and providing 
firm-specific training, but further costs can arise from the attempts of 
insiders to resist competition with outsiders by refusing to cooperate with 
or harassing outsiders who try to underbid the wages of incumbent 
workers” 39. 
These models concentrate on the features of the United States’ labour 
market and mainly refer to the traditional United States model of 
industrial relations, a particularly “exclusive” model, historically centred 
on the male breadwinner and that, in the past, showed a potentially 
discriminatory character against women and minorities.  
The “insider/outsider” literature often refers to what the insiders “do” 
or “try to do” to improve their position at the expense of outsiders and/or 
the employer, as if they constituted an entirely homogeneous social 
entity, capable of behaving “as one single man”. 
It seems evident that these models were designed by making 
reference to “occupational” and mainly enterprise- or shop-based trade 
unionism, traditionally making use of union-shop clauses: under this 
trade union model, it is theoretically possible to coordinate actions of 
workers already employed against those seeking employment, especially 
if the latter were willing to accept worse working conditions than thoee 
employed.  
With many reservations, it could then be argued that the 
“insiders/outsiders” models might provide an account of some features of 
the United States’ industrial relations system.  
Those same theories, however, are hardly applicable to the reality of 
                                                          
38 Even if some restrictions on dismissal exist in almost all the States of the USA, see, 
AUTHOR, Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust Dismissal Doctrine to the Growth of 
Employment, in Journal of Labor Economics, 2003, 21, 1. 
39 A. Lindbeck, D. Snower, Insiders versus Outsiders, supra, note 16. 
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labour markets in continental Europe, where trade union movements 
historically follow very different union traditions and labour market 
strategies, based on “inclusive” policies and where trade unions are 
traditionally organized on a national, multi-employer or cross-sectoral 
basis. It has indeed been argued that general unions organizing workers 
across the occupational lines may counter segmentation in the labour 
market40. 
It seems unrealistic to imagine the insiders acting in a co-ordinated 
fashion to the detriment of outsiders in continental European labour 
markets: where trade union action is predominantly carried out on a 
multi-employer basis, fulfilling systematic marginalisation against 
outsiders would be much more complicated, also from a reputational 
stance.  
Even more difficult is to imagine such marginalisation as carried out by 
insiders if they were defined as those who fall within the scope of 
protection against unfair dismissal, given the aforementioned 
heterogeneity of these subjects and of their conditions of work and the 
related occupational or sectoral interest, in advanced labour markets. 
Moreover, it must again be noted that these theories do not focus on a 
single aspect as a dividing factor. Indeed, according to the relevant 
literature “the insider-outsider distinction provides insight on a wide 
number of divides: employed versus unemployed workers, formal versus 
informal sector employees, employees with high versus low seniority, 
unionized versus nonunionized workers, workers on permanent versus 
temporary contracts, skilled versus unskilled workers, the short-term 
versus the long-term unemployed, and so on”41. 
Also for this reason, identifying insiders and outsiders within labour 
markets on the basis of the scope of the rules restricting dismissal is not 
convincing. 
7. Decentralisation of collective bargaining and the 
risk of marginalisation of non-standard workers 
In the previous section it has been argued that the current 
mainstream approach to labour market segmentation and the legal 
measures adopted in several countries seem unsatisfactory. On the other 
hand, other topical labour law reforms’ paths, unrelated to the scope of 
                                                          
40  S. Deakin, supra, note 6; W. Sengenberger, Labour market segmentation and the 
business cycle, in F.Wilkinson (ed.),The dynamics of labour market segmentation, London, 
1981. 
41 A. Lindbeck, D. Snower, Insiders versus Outsiders, supra, note 16. 
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standard employment contracts and the relevant dismissal regulations, 
could, in the future, spur marginalisation of outsiders.  
In the past years, several measures aimed at decentralizing collective 
bargaining have been taken in different European countries42: an issue 
that seems to be disregarded, in this respect, is how decentralization 
could affect the conduct of trade union movements towards non-standard 
workers and “outsiders” in general. 
As stated in the previous section, the organization of trade unions on a 
general and/or multi-employer basis in continental Europe drives unions 
towards a traditionally “inclusive” approach: the more the workers 
covered by collective bargaining and employment protection the better. A 
different, “exclusive” approach would be difficult to implement on a multi-
employer basis and would not be easy to conceal, thus potentially 
damaging the unions from a reputational standpoint. 
“Exclusive” approaches to workers’ protection could instead stem from 
single-employer and/or “occupational” unionism and collective 
bargaining, possibly leading to marginalisation of outsiders. 
It goes without saying that decentralization of collective bargaining 
does not necessarily convey these adverse effects and that they could 
also be prevented through a proper management of decentralization.  
European institutions, however, apparently overlooked this when they 
endorsed a controversial 2011 reform regarding decentralization of the 
Italian collective bargaining system43. 
Significant steps towards regulated decentralization had already taken 
in the first part of 2011 by the social partners; a cross-sector framework 
agreement (the 2011 agreement) had been stipulated between the most 
representative union confederations and the main employers’ association: 
in particular, national industry–wide collective agreements were called to 
devolve big parts of employment regulation to firm-level agreements. 
In August 2011, however, during the severe financial crisis of the 
Italian public debt, the government decided to intervene. By decree it 
approved a provision (Art. 8, Decree 138/2011-Law 148/2011) regulating 
the decentralization of collective-bargaining agreements in a very 
different way from the 2011 agreement. In particular, Art. 8 stated that 
firm-level agreements could derogate from, and would prevail over, the 
provisions of employment laws and of national collective bargaining 
                                                          
42 See essays published in R. Blanpain, Decentralizing Industrial Relations and the Role of 
Labor Unions and employee Representatives, The Hague, 2007. 
43  EU Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, In-Depth Review for ITALY in 
accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction 
of macroeconomic imbalances, SWD(2012) 156 final. 
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agreements in striking contrast to the 2011 Agreement, according to 
which national agreements would decide methods of devolution to 
decentralized agreements. 
Remarkably, Art. 8 allows enterprise- or shop-level agreements to 
regulate non-standard work such as fixed-term employment, part-time 
employment or temporary agency work, or parasubordinate work and 
self-employment44.  
Moreover, decentralized collective agreements could derogate from the 
statutory joint-liability regime provided in favour of workers of a 
contractor or subcontractor in case of outsourcing and, most notably, 
they could also derogate from legal protections against unfair dismissal.  
Nothing in Art. 8 prevents decentralized agreements from derogating 
from these protections only for firms’ or shops’ new employees, 
preserving instead the statutory protection for the incumbent workforce. 
The 2012 reform followed a different approach on the issue of 
decentralization of collective bargaining and non-standard work: 
collective agreements were entrusted with the regulation of minimum 
compensation for parasubordinate “project workers” and were given the 
power to further flexibilize fixed-term employment and temporary agency 
work.  
Enabling collective agreements to deregulate non-standard work is not 
a novelty for the Italian labour market: similar powers had already been 
conceded by the law since the mid-80s, and it can be said that Italian 
social partners did not abuse them in order to marginalise outsiders, 
particularly because of the above-mentioned “inclusive” rather than 
“exclusive” approach to labour regulation of Italian trade unions. 
Yet these powers were traditionally chiefly granted only to national 
collective agreements and were much narrower in scope than those 
conceded to enterprise- or shop-level agreements under Art. 8. 
According to the 2012 reform, the scope of possible derogations from 
the law was again limited in scope and entrusted to industry-wide 
collective bargaining.  
However, in 2013 the lawmakers reversed their approach and granted 
the same powers to decentralized agreements; moreover, Art. 8 was 
neither repealed nor amended by the 2012 and 2013 reforms. 
In light of the above, the risk of Art. 8 encouraging opportunistic 
conduct against outsiders at the workplace cannot be ruled out: it is 
worth noting that also in this case outsiders would not entirely match 
workers falling outside the scope of dismissal regulation, if one considers 
                                                          
44 See, M. Biasi, supra, note 20. 
A TALE OF OVERSIMPLIFICATION AND DEREGULATION: THE MAINSTREAM APPROACH TO LABOUR 
MARKET SEGMENTATION AND THE RECENT RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
23 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 102/2013 
that firm-level collective agreements could also be in detriment of 
employees of contractors or subcontractors that may well be covered by 
dismissal protection under Art. 18 of Statuto dei Lavoratori. 
It can therefore be argued that, despite their claimed goal to balance 
the situation of insiders and outsiders in the labour market, recent 
reforms in Italy also included provisions that may go absolutely in the  
opposite direction.  
Again, it must be stressed that decentralization of collective bargaining 
cannot automatically be associated with opportunistic behaviour of 
standard employees: in northern Europe, for instance, flexibility 
measures are specifically provided via collective bargaining, in particular 
through a derigation from sector-level to firm-level agreements. This 
provides the system with an appreciable degree of flexibility within a 
general system of regulation and it has not lead to a marginalisation of 
atypical workers, even if these systems may somehow begin to creak45. 
In other European countries, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, 
however, the recent reforms significantly untied firm-level collective 
bargaining from industry-wide agreements and legal regulations46: the 
risk is the stipulation of firm-level collective agreements outside a general 
regulation framework, posing serious problems in terms of workers’ 
protection. Moreover, this could induce a centrifugal development of 
industrial-relations systems possibly leading to a “de-generalization” of 
trade-union action with potential negative effects on the weaker part of 
                                                          
45  See M. Rönnmar, A. Numhauser-Henning, Flexicurity, Employability and Changing 
Employment Protection in a Global Economy. A study of labour law developments in Sweden 
in a European context, Lund University, 2012. In Denmark, J. Due, J. S. Madsen J. S., The 
Danish Model of Industrial Realations: Erosion or Renewal?, in Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 50, 2008, pages 513-529, speak of “Centralized decentralization”, covering “both 
a controlled delegation of bargaining rights from sector level to enterprise level in the 
bargaining system, and, at the same time, implies that the norms and values of the central 
system are retained down through the delegation process”. They however argue that 
“despite the relative strength of the Danish model [a] comprehensive analysis of 
developments in the Danish labour market over the past decade shows that here too it is 
possible to discern clear tendencies towards erosion of the collective regulation […]. 
Centralized decentralization would appear to be evolving in the direction of a kind of ‘multi-
level regulation’, in which the controlling role of the sector organizations is being 
challenged”. 
46 The EU Commission welcomed decentralisation of collective bargaining systems also with 
regard to Spain and Portugal. See EU Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, 
Assessment of the 2012 national reform programme and stability programme for SPAIN, 
SWD(2012) 310 final  and EU Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, 
Assessment of the 2012 national reform programme and stability programme for 
PORTUGAL, SWD(2012) 324 final. See also S. González Ortega, La negociación colectiva en 
el Real Decreto-Ley de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado laboral, in Temas 
Laborales, 115, 2012, pages 85-134. 
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the workforce, including non-standard workers.  
8. Much before “flexibility-at-the-margin”: is labour 
market segmentation just a feature of our times?  
When advocating decentralisation of collective bargaining, therefore, 
European institutions tend to manifestly overlook its potential detrimental 
effect on atypical workers.  
This, however, does not come as a surprise: following a narrative 
whereby segmentation is a function of the scope of standard employment 
relations and all the workers covered by dismissal regulation are 
regarded as “insiders”, one may overlook other typical elements of 
differentiation across the labour market, such as the ones described in 
Section 5. 
As already mentioned, this mainstream approach and the related 
“insiders-outsiders” narrative neglects consideration of other theories on 
segmentation of the labour market that seem to provide for a more 
comprehensive account on this issue.  
It can be noted, for instance, that segmentation is not a recent 
occurrence that could be chiefly imputed to the “flexibility-at-the-margin” 
policies adopted in the last decades.  
The existence of a “primary” and a “secondary” labour market is not a 
phenomenon of our times: from the dawn of industrialization certain 
categories of workers have enjoyed better economic and regulatory 
conditions in comparison with “weaker” workers; a difference in the 
condition of workers involved subcontracting or other forms of business 
dis-integration, such as home workers has always existed47. 
It could be said, however, that, during the last forty years, a 
mainstream business trend towards de-concentration of big firms and 
outsourcing can be seen, which has given rise to business structures 
following a “core/periphery” pattern: firms have tended to progressively 
divest those parts of their production cycle which are not relevant to their 
core business48. 
This has swollen the ranks of “contingent” or “marginal” workforce, 
hired under contractual arrangements that are typical of vertical 
disintegration, such as contracting or subcontracting or non-standard 
                                                          
47 See L. Mariucci, Il lavoro decentrato. Discipline legislative e contrattuali, Milan, 1979. 
48  J. Atkinson, Flexibility, uncertainty and Manpower strategy, Report n. 89, Institute of 
Manpower Studies, Brighton, 1985; Id., Manpower strategies for flexible organizations, in 
Personnel Management, 1984, pages 28-31. See also, L. Hunter, A. McGregor, J. Maclnnes, 
A. Sproull, The ‘Flexible Firm’: Strategy and Segmentation, in British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 31 1993 383-407. 
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working contracts49. By contrast, workers employed within core business’ 
sectors tend still to be offered significant job stability through open-
ended employment contracts. 
Very often, the contingent workforce is employed at the margin of 
business production, executing activities that require a low level of 
professionalism or skills.  
These activities normally display very low asset-specificity and require 
very limited training, significantly reducing the cost of replacing a worker 
assigned to them. Non-standard workers such as fixed-term employees 
and temporary agency workers (TAW) may be particularly affected in this 
respect, since – according to labour market statistics – they markedly 
tend to carry out unskilled work50. For this reason it does not seem 
possible to improve the working conditions of the contingent workforce by 
lowering the levels of protection of standard employees.  
It is arguable that loosening, or eliminating, protection against 
dismissal would lower the incentive to resort to non-standard contracts 
and to subcontracting, albeit subcontracting did exist long before the 
introduction of dismissal regulations in several countries51. However, this 
would not necessarily increase the contingent workforce’s job stability, 
since its low asset-specificity makes the replacement of marginal workers 
easy and cheap.  
Core/periphery models may represent an explanation of labour market 
segmentation that is more accurate than describing the labour market as 
divided between insiders and outsiders on the basis of the scope of 
dismissal regulations: entrepreneurial strategies aimed at curbing 
production costs and making business organizations leaner can be seen 
as one of the fundamental causes of segmentation even if it is not taken 
                                                          
49 H. Collins, Independent contractors and the challenge of vertical disintegration, in Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 10, 1990, pages 353–380. 
50 This is a longstanding occurrence in the Italian labour market, see L. Cavallaro, D. Palma, 
Come (non) uscire dal dualismo del mercato del lavoro: note critiche sulla proposta di 
contratto unico a tutele crescenti, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, 2008, pages 507–
528. See also G. Alteri, L. Birindelli, F. Dota, Giuliano Ferrucci Un mercato del lavoro sempre 
più “atipico”: scenario della crisi, Rapporto di Ricerca n. 08/2011, IRES CGIL, 64, reporting 
that 71% of Italian TAWs were carrying out unskilled working activities in 2011. According 
to Rapporto Isfol 2012, Le competenze per l’occupazione e la crescita, Rome, 2012, 
temporary workers show higher rates of overqualification. Low-skill workers are 
overrepresented among fixed-term in Spain, according to S. Bentolila, J. F., Jimeno, J. J. 
Dolado, supra, note 4. Also in the U.S.A., non-standard workers tend to carry out unskilled 
jobs: see data in Kellberg, Flexible Firms and Labor Market Segmentation: Effects of 
Workplace Restructuring on Jobs and Workers, in Work and Occupations, 30, 2003, pages 
154-175. 
51 G. Giugni, Organizzazione dell’impresa ed evoluzione dei rapporti giuridici. La retribuzione 
a cottimo, in Rivista di Diritto del Lavoro, 1968, pages 1-85. 
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into account by the mainstream narrative on this topic. 
9. All permanent, all precarious: the “single permanent 
contract”, its mates and its flaws. 
In the light of what has been observed in the previous part, flattening 
employment protections in order to reduce the gap between standard and 
non-standard workers would hardly result in better working conditions or 
higher job stability for marginal workers operating outside employers’ 
core businesses.  
It is, instead, the EU Commission’s belief that a “reduction of 
segmentation in the labour market [...] could be facilitated by altering 
employment protection legislation, by for instance extending the use of 
open-ended contractual arrangements with a gradual increase of 
protection rights to diminish the existing divisions between those holding 
atypical and permanent contracts”.  
According to the Commission, a set of policies to be encouraged in this 
respect “includes the adoption of a «single permanent contract», 
replacing the existing legal asymmetry between permanent and fixed-
term contracts”52.  
The “single permanent contract” has been promoted in different 
European countries by some economists and lawyers53: it would be an 
open-ended employment contract with a long (on average 2–3 years) 
probation/consolidation period during which employees would not be 
covered by the ordinary protection against unfair dismissal and their 
contract could be terminated, subject to the payment of an indemnity 
varying upon the relevant length of service.  
A significant debate took place in last few years in Spain and Italy, 
concerning the “single permanent contract” 54.  
Several bills were presented to the Italian parliament in this respect, 
                                                          
52 EU Commission, Employment in Europe 2010. See also, Id., Labour Market Developments 
in Europe 2012, supra, note 12. 
53 S. Bentolila, J. F., Jimeno, J. J. Dolado, supra, note 4; P. Ichino, Inchiesta sul lavoro, 
supra, note 18; J. Andrés, A Proposal to Restart the Spanish Labour Market, 2009, available 
at http://www.crisis09.es/PDF/restart-the-labor-market.pdf; S. Bentolila, J. J. Dolado, J. F. 
Jimeno (2008), Two-Tier Employment Protection Reforms: The Spanish Experience, CESifo 
DICE Report 4/2008. P. Cahuc. F. Kramarz, De la précarité à la mobilité, vers une sécurité 
sociale professionnelle, Rapport pour le Ministre de l’Economie et des Finances, La 
documentation Française, 2004 available at ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports- 
publics/054000092/index.shtml; O. J. Blanchard, J. Tirole, Contours of Employment 
Protection Reform, MIT Department of Economics Working Paper 03-35, 2003;  
54 See L. Zappalà, supra, note 9; P. Gete, P. Porchia, A real options analysis of dual labor 
markets and the single labor contract, in MPRA (Munich Personal RePEc) ArchivePaper, No. 
34055, 2011. 
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but were not included within the last reforms. Nonetheless, some 
measures that may have an impact on the labour market akin to the 
potential effects of the introduction of a single permanent contract were 
recently approved in some jurisdictions. In Spain, for example, this is the 
case of the above-mentioned “employment contract to support 
entrepreneurs” (ECSE), a contract whereby a statutory probationary 
period is in force for one year, irrespective of the job position/role in 
firms whose workforce is under 50 employees. In the UK, the qualifying 
period before an employee accrues unfair dismissal rights was raised 
from 1 to 2 years in 201255. 
These measures may be comparable to the introduction of the SPC as 
they allow employers to dismiss workers for a long period of time before 
the latter acquire full unfair dismissal rights 56 . Several bills were 
presented to the Italian parliament in this respect, but were not included 
within the last reforms. Nonetheless, some measures that may have an 
impact on the labour market akin to the potential effects of the 
introduction of a single permanent contract were recently approved in 
some jurisdictions. In Spain, for example, this is the case of the above-
mentioned “employment contract to support entrepreneurs” (ECSE), a 
contract whereby a statutory probationary period is in force for one year, 
irrespective of the job position/role in firms whose workforce is under 50 
employees. In the UK, the qualifying period before an employee accrues 
unfair dismissal rights was raised from 1 to 2 years in 201257. Thus, 
keeping the possibility of dismissing workers outbalanced monetary 
incentives: this can also provide useful lessons with regard to the SPC, as 
employers may well opt for paying severance instead of employing 
workers until they become entitled to unfair dismissal protection. 
It goes without saying that this will not always be the case under a 
SPC regime as employers may not want to disperse firm-specific skills 
and know-how accrued by their employees, or to avoid the cost of 
                                                          
55 K. D. Ewing, J. Hendy, Unfair Dismissal Law Changes—Unfair?, in Industrial Law Journal, 
41, 2012, pages 115-121; E. McGaughey, Unfair dismissal reform: political ping-pong with 
equality?, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2014699. 
56 Another comparable measure is the abovementioned possibility of entering into fixed-
term contracts and of extending them up to 12 months without specifying the relevant 
business reason in Italy. This allows firms to use fixed-term contract as a sort of “extended” 
probation period and it is therefore comparable to the long probation/qualifying period 
discussed in this part, with a major difference: under Italian law, serving dismissal before 
the expiry of a fixed-term contract is only possible when a just cause of termination exists. 
57  Data is avaliable at http://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2013-11-13/exito-del-
contrato-de-emprendedores-el-85-es-para-trabajos-de-un-solo-ano_52576/  
28 VALERIO DE STEFANO 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 102/2013 
replacing them58; but in case of unskilled labour and a lack of asset-
specificity, replacement costs would be particularly low and thus the 
incentive to substitute workers before they acrue unfair dismissal rights 
will be paramount.  
In such a situation, the risk that unskilled or marginal workers undergo 
an indefinite series of “probation/qualifying periods” with several 
employers and are dismissed before accruing full dismissal rights is very 
high: those workers would still be trapped in a vicious and permanent 
circle of precarious employment. 
The SPC can thus prove blatantly ineffective in protecting “outsiders” 
such as non-standard workers as they, more often than not, carry out 
low-skilled activities; on the other hand, the SPC would significantly lower 
the protection of standard workers as they will not be protected against 
unfair dismissal before the expiry of a probation/qualifying period much 
longer than in the past (according to some Italian bills, from 359 to 20 
years60).  
Moreover, it must be noted that the SPC is actually unlikely to be a 
“single” contract replacing all other forms of working contract in the 
labour market: if one looks at the Italian bills proposing the SPC, for 
instance, they all maintain the possibility of entering into fixed-term 
contracts for temporary reasons and into temporary agency work in order 
to comply with Directive 2008/104/EC.  
Nor it will be possible to eliminate self-employment contracts: the 
Italian bills, for instance, aim at reregulating self-employment in order to 
have economically dependent self-employees covered by the SPC 
legislation on the basis of quantitative remunerative parameters: these 
                                                          
58  It is also worth noting According to J. I. García Pérez, V. Osuna, The Effects of 
Introducing a Single Open- ended Contract in the Spanish Labour Market, mimeo, 
Universidad Pablo de Olavide, 2011, before the equalization of severance-payment amounts 
described at part 3 above, turnover rate for employees under an employment-promotion 
permanent contract markedly outdistanced that of standard employees’. 
59 See d.d.l. 2630/2009 (Camera. Prima firmataria on. Madia); d.d.l. 2000/2010 (Senato. 
Primo firmatario sen. Nerozzi). See also d.d.l. 4277/2011 (Camera. Primi firmatari onn. 
Raisi, Della Vedova). 
60 See d.d.l. 1481/2009 (Senato. Primo Firmatario sen. Ichino); 2630/2009; 1873/2009 
(Senato. Primo firmatario sen. Ichino); d.d.l 1006/2013 (Primo Firmatario sen. Ichino). This 
20-year period would only apply to dismissal for economic reason, a different, more 
protective, regulation being provided for disciplinary dismissal. However, since according to 
these bills the court would not be able to review the authenticity of the relevant economic 
reason, it would be straightforward for employers to avoid the disciplinary dismissal 
regulation by terminating the contract on the basis of an economic reason.  
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legal techniques have however been sternly challenged61 and would have 
the effect of merely relocating the borders of the “grey-area” between a 
newly deregulated employment and self-employment rather than provide 
for adequate protections for the latter. 
Therefore, non-standard working contracts will continue to have 
material relevance in the labour markets even under a SPC regime.  
In light of the above, the SPC proposals would then continue to 
contrast segmentation of the labour market at the expense of standard 
workers rather than through an increase of non-standard workers 
protection and job stability: in this respect, then, these proposals 
materially follow the path of the recent disappointing reforms aimed at 
reducing labour market segmentation in European Member States.   
Notoriously, the SPC idea was significantly inspired by the French 
Contrat Nouvelles Embauches: an employment agreement whereby 
employees could not challenge a dismissal grounded by economic reasons 
during an initial period of two years. The Contrat Nouvelles Embauches 
was repealed in France in 2008, after case law had found it in breach of 
international obligations. In particular, the Contrat was held to be an 
infringement of International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention no. 
158 “concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the 
Employer”.  
Pursuant to the convention, employees have the right not to be 
terminated “unless there is a valid reason” and, in case of termination, 
the right “to appeal against that termination to an impartial body”. 
Moreover, French case law held that the initial period of two years was 
not compliant with the convention’s provision that allows probation or 
qualifying periods “of reasonable duration”62.  
The European Commission and other European and international 
institutions seem to overlook the disappointing experience of Contrat 
Nouvelles Embauches when advocating the SPC. This is quite surprising, 
given that this measure was repealed a very short time after its 
enactment because of a blatant breach of an ILO convention; initiatives 
of Member States aimed at introducing the SPC – particularly if such 
introduction were encouraged by European institutions – could create a 
conflict between the labour reforms of those Member States and the ILO 
protection against dismissal, potentially leading to an awkward clash 
                                                          
61  See O. Razzolini, Defining Economic Dependency on the Basis of Quantitative 
Remunerative Parameters. Is this the Answer to the Increasing Demand for a Social 
Contract Law?, in European Journal of Social Law, 2011, pages 187-206 
62 See Cour d’Appel de Paris, Arrêt du 9 juillet 2007, RG n.06/06992; Cour de cassation, 
civile, Chambre sociale, 1 juillet 2008, 07-44.124. 
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between international labour standards and measures taken following the 
recommendations of EU institutions on the one hand and to significant 
litigation in different Member States, concerning the legitimacy of the 
SPC regime, as it could breach the obligations of a country under 
international treaties, on the other.  
10. Protections against dismissal as a means of 
underpinning fundamental and constitutional rights. 
The repeal of the Contrat Nouvelles Embauches due to its 
contravention to France’s international obligations, offers the opportunity 
to outline some concluding remarks. 
One could wonder why the above-mentioned ILO Convention, as well 
as many other international or European treaties or charters and national 
legislation, give so much importance to the right not to be dismissed 
without a valid reason.  
The immediate answer may of course be that regulations against 
unfair dismissal allow employees’ to preserve their job and salary as their 
main source of income. Some justifications for regulating dismissal can 
also be drawn on the basis of economic theories63. 
However, from a legal standpoint, other justifications for effective 
dismissal protection cannot be overlooked: regulation against unfair 
dismissal can be pivotal in securing the exercise of other rights at the 
workplace, some of which can very well be fundamental or – in some 
jurisdictions – constitutional rights. 
If no protection against dismissal were provided, employees might be 
reluctant to make use of rights such as the rights concerning working 
time, sick pay, parental protection or even the right to unionize or to 
participate to industrial actions since they might be afraid of losing their 
job were they to do so. 
 For instance one reason why employers resort to temporary work 
contracts in Italy, even if – from a legal standpoint – these contracts 
afford a lower degree of functional flexibility in comparison with a 
permanent employment relationship may also lie in the fact that, given 
the temporary nature of these relationship, temporary workers may feel 
forced to implicitly waive some of their statutory or contractual rights by 
not exercising them, in order not to displease the employer and try to 
                                                          
63 See P. Ichino, Lezioni di diritto del lavoro. Un approccio di labour law and economics, 
Milano, 2004, chapters II and X. 
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obtain either an extension or a renewal of their contract64.  
Regulations granting a certain level of job stability, such as an unfair 
dismissal regulation, can then prove essential to make other employment 
and labour rights effective.  
A good example in this respect is provided by the case law of the 
Italian Constitutional Court on the statute of limitation for the payment of 
salaries. The Civil Code, enacted in 1942, provided for a reduced statute 
of limitation for claiming unpaid or outstanding salaries. According to the 
court, the statute of limitation must be held as not running during the 
course of employment, since “the fear of being dismissed induces or may 
induce employees to waive part of their own rights; thus, when such 
waivers are made during the course of employment, employees cannot 
be deemed to have acted according to their own free will”65. This principle 
finds a significant exception when the employees enjoy effective 
protection of their job stability because the court can order the 
reinstatement of an employee 66: in this case the fear of losing one’s job 
is presumed to be restrained by strong unfair dismissal protections.  
This case law, then, shows a very close link between actual protection 
of job stability and the effectiveness of other rights during the 
employment: it could be argued that a significant shortcoming of the SPC 
proposal is overlooking this strong link. This seems to be true even for 
those SPC bills providing very strong protection against discriminatory, 
retaliatory or arbitrary dismissals, the latter being defined under some of 
the bills as “those terminations based upon mere whimsical grounds, 
meaning trivial reasons totally unrelated to the economic, technical, 
organizational or productive needs of the business”67.  
One of the main aims of the SPC approach is to “secure” a decision to 
                                                          
64 V. De Stefano, Smuggling-in flexibility: temporary work contracts and the “implicit threat” 
mechanism. Reflections on a new European path, in, Labour Administration and Inspection 
Programme LAB/ADMIN Working Document, 4/2009, International Labour Organization– 
Geneva. See N. Kountouris, The legal determinants of precariousness in personal work 
relations: a European perspective, in Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 34, 2012, 
pages 21-46. 
65 Corte Costituzionale,10 giugno 1963, n. 63. 
66 Corte Costituzionale 20 novembre 1969, n. 143; Corte Costituzionale. 29 aprile 1971, n. 
86; Corte Costituzionale, 1° giugno 1979, nn. 40-44; Corte Costituzionale, 10 febbraio 
1981, n. 13. This was the case of the protection under art. 18 of the Statuto dei Lavoratori 
before the 2012-reform but the exception was firstly introduced with regard to other 
employment regimes under which reinstatement could be ordered, such as in the case of 
civil servants. It is debatable whether the exception will continue to apply to employees 
protected by art 18, since reinstatement is no longer automatically adopted in case of unfair 
dismissal.  
67 d.d.l. 1481/2009;1873/2009; d.d.l 1006/2013, supra, note 60 
32 VALERIO DE STEFANO 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona".INT – 102/2013 
dismiss employees, by exempting employers from providing a valid 
reason for dismissal and preventing courts from reviewing the 
authenticity of such reason: in this case providing evidence that 
discrimination occurred might be extremely burdensome for employees 
as it would be easy for employers to disguise discriminatory or retaliatory 
dismissal under any business reason not meeting the very stringent 
definition of “whimsical grounds”.   
SPC regimes may thus fall short of providing effective protection 
against discriminatory conduct at the workplace: this could lead to a 
breach of fundamental and human rights concerning discrimination, 
enshrined in countless international and European treaties and 
conventions as well as in many national constitutions.  
It is also worth noting that when the qualifying period was first raised 
to 2 years in the UK in 1985 – a measure that, as argued in the previous 
paragraph, may have effects comparable to the introduction of the SPC – 
the House of Lords found that this regulation had had a disparate adverse 
impact on women68: in questioning the 2012-raise it has recently been 
argued that a risk of disparate impact may now also arise with regard to 
race and other characteristics such as “income and education”69.  
The same concerns can be expressed also with regard to the SPC 
proposals: employment regulations making a significant number of 
dismissals exempt from the need of a valid reason may thus have both 
direct and indirect discriminatory outcomes. 
 These concerns may be extended to different approaches to labour 
market regulation – frequently lumped together under the umbrella-label 
of “flexicurity” – aimed at substituting “protection on the job” for 
“protection on the market”, as they often seem to artificially “sever” job 
stability protection from other fundamental employment protection, 
disregarding the profound links between them, some of which were 
described above70.  
It is therefore reductive to see job stability as a mere protection of 
one’s income that can be easily put aside if efficient unemployment 
                                                          
68 R (Seymour-Smith) v Secretary of State for Employment, [2000] UKHL 12, [2000] 1 WLR 
435 and (1999) C-167/97.  
69 See, E. McGaughey, supra, note 55. 
70  See H. Collins, Theories of Right as Justifications for Labour Law, in G. Davidov, B. 
Langille, The Idea of Labour Law, Oxford, 2011, pages 137-155, who argues that the idea of 
social security systems as a substitute for job protection “seems to view a job as a merely a 
means to the end of securing an income. Whilst that may be true for some workers, most 
people attach more significance to their jobs. The job helps to achieve other primary goods 
such as self-respect, and can be a way of developing other capacities through dialogue and 
social interaction”. 
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benefits and active labour market policy systems were adopted 71 , 
replacing salaries and job protection with unemployment benefits and 
permanent job training.  
These approaches seem to overlook that, during the employment 
relationship, people are subject to extensive managerial prerogatives and 
hierarchical powers of employers, which are enshrined in, and protected 
by, the law. From a legal point of view, one cannot disregard the fact that 
employment protection is not only granted with the aim of securing the 
employee’s income but also in order to provide for some countervailing 
powers to these business prerogatives 72 . As argued above, dismissal 
regulation can play a very important role in underpinning the 
effectiveness of other fundamental and human rights: this role should not 
be neglected when discussing amendments and reforms of labour market 
regulations.  
                                                          
71 And this does not seem to be the case of many European countries, where unemployment 
benefit systems were materially shrinked in recent years: see 
72 See O. Kahn-Freund, Labour and the law, London, 1972, who chiefly referred to collective 
labour law. For an analysis of the impact of collective protection at the individual 
employment contract level see S. Liebman, Individuale e collettivo nel contratto di lavoro, 
Milano, 1993.  
